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All bodies in the sublunary word are composed of mixtures of all the primary elements – fire, 
air, earth, and water.  Aristotle argues for the primacy of these four elements in the 
constitution of objects in our word.  He further develops an original theory of mixing of 
elements to explain the formation of uniform matter such as granite, flesh, or oil.  His theory 
of mixing of elements has received much attention in the past decade, resulting in an exciting 
array of interpretations that have also generated contributions to contemporary philosophy.  
In what follows I offer an account of Aristotle’s theory of elements and their mixtures, and 





Aristotle sets out to explain the constitution of things in the world through the process of 
their generation and corruption.  He bases his ontological investigation on the very 
foundations of the cosmological edifice, the elements: ‘an element … is a body into which 
other bodies may be analysed’ (De Caelo, 302a15-16).  If there is to be generation in the 
world, there needs to be more than one element; for otherwise, every thing would be that 
element in merely altered states (Generation and Corruption, 332a6-9).  Change is to 
contraries (e.g. from being hot to being cold, GC 332a7-8); but contraries do not change into 
each other (e.g. it is not the hot which becomes cold, but the hot body, 329b1-2); nor do 
contraries underlie each other as matter (e.g. the hot does not constitute the cold, 329a32-33); 
rather, a third thing, the matter, underlies the contraries and remains through the change 
(332a7-18).  The matter is inseparable from the contraries, and with them constitutes the 
elements (329a24-27). 
 
Aristotle explores which contraries are the primary ones for the constitution of tangible 
bodies by considering several candidate pairs of contraries.  He engages in a characterisation 
of the various contraries such as viscosity, softness, hardness, liquidity, solidity, etc., in terms 
of their functional properties, on the basis of which he concludes that some are derivable 
from others: ‘all other differentiae are reducible to these four primary ones, whereas these 
cannot further be reduced to any smaller number’ (330a24-26).  The four primary contraries 
are the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry (329b25-31).   
 
On the basis of the four contrary qualities, Aristotle derives that their combinations result in 
there being four elements or primary bodies: ‘fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet (for air is 
something like steam), water cold and wet, and earth cold and dry’ (330b3-5).  The four 
elements have natural places in the sublunary world, and a natural movement by which they 
get there: ‘fire and air belong to that which moves towards the boundary, earth and water to 
that which moves towards the middle’ (330b32-33).  In De Caelo he explains that earth is 
absolutely heavy, and moves naturally downwards towards the centre of the universe, if not 
impeded, while fire is absolutely light, and moves naturally upwards.  Air and water combine 
these properties and are intermediate, ‘since while they rise to the surface of some bodies 
they sink to the bottom of others’ (311a23-24).  Their natural movement is explained in terms 
of their lightness and heaviness: ‘that which produces upward and downward movement is 
that which produces weight and lightness’ (310a31-32).  Since, as we have seen in 
Generation and Corruption, all other differentia of bodies are reducible to the four primary 
ones, ‘that which produces’ the movement and the weight and the lightness is to be traced to 
the primary contraries.   
 
The notion of being absolutely light and absolutely heavy in De Caelo is an indication of the 
way Aristotle understands the four primary contrary qualities.  The hot, for example, in fire 
and air, is absolute heat, and the wet in water and air is absolute wetness.  So understood, the 
four primary qualities in Generation and Corruption are in fact contradictories, as Williams 
also observes, rather than contraries.
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  But combinations of the primary elements produces 
material that possesses the contraries to various degrees.   
 
Aristotle considers various alternative models for the generation of the primary elements, and 
concludes that their generation is reciprocal from one another.  What makes this possible is 
their composition in terms of pairs of contraries which the matter of each element can lose or 
gain.  Thus ‘from fire there will be air if one of its properties changes, the former having 
been hot and dry whilst the latter is hot and wet, so that if the dryness is conquered by 
wetness there will be air.  Again from air there will be water if the heat is conquered by cold, 
the former having been hot and wet, the latter cold and wet, so that if the heat changes there 
will be water’ and so on. (331a26-32)  No element has any type of priority over the others 
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Combining the Elements 
 
Every object that is not uniform is composed of uniform stuff (321b18-19).  Nonuniform 
objects are those whose parts are of a different type than the whole, e.g. a tree, a house or an 
animal.  The leaves of the tree are not roots, nor are they composed of wood, and the finger 
of an animal is not a tooth, nor composed of the same stuff as it.  But the stuff that 
nonuniform objects are composed of is uniform, e.g. flesh and bone for the finger, and wood 
and soft tissue for the tree.  Uniform stuff is the material of the world around us.  It is 
therefore significant for Aristotle’s investigation of nature that an account be given of the 
generation of uniform matter.  As we would expect, and as we shall see, there is an intimate 
connection between the primary elements and uniform matter.  All uniform matter is 
composed of all four of the elements; it is generated by a process that Aristotle calls mixing.  
What is metaphysically significant is that mixing is different from, and does not involve, 
substantial composition, although a new entity is created through mixing.  Understanding 
Aristotle’s account of this alternative metaphysical phenomenon of generation is our task in 
what follows.   
 
We can hardly improve on Aristotle’s introduction to the problem of mixing.  He begins with 
a puzzle he inherited (327a33-b6):  there are three possibilities, presumed exhaustive, of an 
account of mixing, none of which delivers the phenomenon.  First, if the things that have 
been mixed still persist unaltered in the mixture, then they have not been mixed since they 
remain the same as they were before they entered the mixture.  Secondly, if either of the 
original ingredients is destroyed in the process of mixing, then they are not mixed since there 
is only one remaining, while in a mixture the ingredients are in the same condition.  Thirdly, 
it follows that there is no mixing if both ingredients are destroyed in the process, since they 
cannot be in the state of being mixed in the mixture if they are not at all (hols ouk onta).   
 
It may appear that the outlined possibilities suffer from a rather obvious lacuna, namely that 
the first option can be subdivided into two: they both persist unaltered, or they persist altered.  
But this would not affect the puzzle.  If both ingredients persist in the mixture, each of them 
in an altered state, since they could have been found in that same state independently of 
being mixed, there is no reason to suppose they are mixed; there is nothing that marks off 
their state as mixed rather than unmixed.  This presupposes that for an ingredient to be mixed 
with another is not for them to come to some external relation that respects their claim to 
persistence.  Such relations between items abound without the items thereby becoming mixed 
with each other.  In general, we need to assume that for the puzzle to have a bite, no way in 
which the ingredients can be when unmixed will explain how they are in a mixture, since 
they can be that way unmixed.  That this is what Aristotle has in mind is confirmed by the 
fact that he takes this puzzle to invite us to differentiate between mixing on the one hand, and 
generation and corruption on the other (327b6-9); the qualification of the first horn that they 
persist unaltered plays no role in the dilemma; the relevant factors in the reasoning are only 
persistence and corruption, not alteration.   
 
So we have learned that mixing cannot be explained in terms of the ingredients persisting or 
ceasing to be.  But before offering his explanation of mixing, Aristotle introduces a further 
condition: ‘when two things are mixed each must exist as a separable thing’ (327b21-22).  A 
thing is not mixed with its affections, or its dispositions, since neither affections nor 
dispositions ever exist separately without belonging to some subject.  What is initially 
surprising is that Aristotle invokes this separateness condition for mixing to exclude these 
cases, although he has just achieved the same effect on the basis of the conditions of the 
initial puzzle.  He has just pointed out that affections and dispositions cannot be mixed with 
the things that have them because they are preserved (327b15-17, b29-30).  So these cases 
are already blocked by the first horn of the dilemma.  If something persists, whether it enjoys 
an independent or a dependent existence, it cannot be in a state of being mixed while 
persisting.  Affections and dispositions persist when they come to be possessed by a 
substance; when a body becomes white: ‘both remain in actuality … the body and its 
whiteness’ (327b29-30).  Why then introduce the separateness condition since persistence 
suffices?  There may be more than one motivation, but what I take to be crucial in this 
clarification is that ontological dependence itself is different from mixing.  This is of 
particular importance for the explanation Aristotle gives of mixing (in the very same passage, 
327b22-26), which makes use of the notion of potential existence.  It is not ontological 
dependence that is at the root of mixtures, because ontological dependence does not 
undermine the actuality of the dependents, as we just saw with the body and its whiteness; 
whereas mixing must undermine the actuality of the ingredients, if we are to escape the 
dilemma above.   
 
Since the ingredients cannot cease to be nor persist in a mixture, not only alteration but 
transformation, too, namely generation or corruption, is different from mixing.  When wood 
burns, it is not being mixed with fire.  Rather, it ceases to be and fire is generated (327b10-
13).  Growth is not mixing either, because one component persists, the growing one, and the 
other ceases to be, the nourishment (321a34-35, 322a11-13).
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  The phenomenon of growth is different from that of generation too.  In growth, as in 
alteration, the object that grows persists in actuality and survives the change, but 
becomes altered; each part of it becomes larger due to another thing which accedes to 
it (321a19-22).  The thing that accedes does not survive because its substance is 
destroyed (321a34) when it is assimilated in the growing object.   
 
 
Mixing by Division 
 
Aristotle considers the mechanism of mixing by division as the main candidate for explaining 
the survival of the original ingredients in the mixture, and their recoverability; division 
generates small parcels of matter, preserving the kind and the parts of the original 
ingredients.  The first account of mixing Aristotle considers is one where the parcels are so 
small that it is not possible to discern the parcels of one of the ingredients in the mixture from 
the parcels of the other ingredient (327b32-35) – I will assume, with Aristotle, that there are 
two ingredients only, for simplicity.  I agree with Williams (p. 146) that it is not necessary, in 
this first account, that the parcels of stuff are alternating between the two kinds.  All that the 
present conception of mixture requires is that they be small enough for their difference in 
kind to be imperceptible, whether they are clustered together in small groups per kind or not.  
He immediately abandons this possibility, and the reasons why can be discerned from the 
conditions that characterise mixtures, which we gradually encounter in what follows.   
 
There are three reasons that speak against mixtures modulo perception.  The first and most 
important condition is that mixtures, according to Aristotle, are homoeomerous - uniform.  At 
first glance, mixtures modulo perception appear uniform, which might suggest that they 
satisfy the uniformity requirement.  But Aristotle tell us what he means by uniformity, which 
is a much more stringent requirement than uniformity in appearance: ‘just as a part of water 
is water so it is with what has been mingled’ (328a11-12); so a part of a mixture must be the 
same kind of stuff as the whole mixture.  Clearly what looks uniform but consists of parcels 
of matter of two different kinds does not satisfy the criterion for being a homoeomer.  Even if 
the whole is taken to be a ratio of the two different kinds of stuff, small enough parts of the 
whole will consist of one only kind of stuff.   
 
The second reason against mixtures modulo perception is that the resulting whole is not a 
mixture but a composition of parts.  This objection too is premised on the uniformity of 
mixtures.  Since every part of a mixture is the same kind as every other part of it, mixtures 
are not compositions of parts that are different in kind in the way that salt and pepper, when 
intermingled, are.  Finally, the third reason is the relativity of perception.  Aristotle says that 
“‘being mixed’ would be relative to perception: one and the same thing will be mixed for one 
man whose sight is not sharp, whereas for Lynceus nothing is mixed” (328a13-15).  Williams 
thinks that the relativity of perception is a defeasible objection to mixing modulo perception, 
since there comes a point of smallness of parcels of matter which makes them indiscernible 
to human sight (p. 146).  So even Lynceus would not be able to tell that the mixture is not 
uniform.  But there is no in principle impossibility of (technologically aided) discernability, 
which suffices for the objection to stand. 
 
Aristotle’s second attempt at mixing by division is far more sophisticated and complex.  We 
are again considering the division of the ingredients into small parcels (eis mikra) but now, 
they must be, not small enough to be indiscernible to perception, but small enough to be 
‘arranged in such a way that every single part of either of the things mixed is alongside some 
part of the other’ (328a1-2).  For example, consider salt and pepper so arranged.  Aristotle 
examines whether such an explanation will satisfy two conditions for mixing.  The one is that 
every body, including mixtures, is divisible, but not thoroughly divided, which is an 
Aristotelian metaphysical tenet.  The second is that a mixture is uniform.  To show that the 
present account of mixture satisfies uniformity, he considers a second conception of 
uniformity (after the abandoned ‘uniformity in appearance’), which is that ‘every part of one 
[ingredient] would have to come to be alongside some part of the other’ (328a5).  At first 
glance, salt and pepper could satisfy this homoeomerity requirement if properly arranged.  
But the impossibility of thorough division blocks this possibility.  For a successful adjacency 
arrangement it would be necessary that each ingredient was divided into the smallest possible 
parts, which would then be arranged side by side, ensuring that no two parts of a single 
ingredient were adjacent.  But since every body is divisible, but not thoroughly divided, 
every part of each of the ingredients will be divisible, and there will be no smallest parts 
(328a5-6).  Hence, uniformity cannot be satisfied even on its second conception of adjacency 
of parts.  And the final blow is struck by Aristotle pointing out that even if it were satisfied, 
still this would not be a mixture because this conception of uniformity is not the appropriate 
one for mixtures.  Adjacency is a type of composition, not mixing, which requires a different 
kind of uniformity than composition.   
 
Williams thinks that Aristotle fails to make his case against mixing being composition (pp. 
146-148).  He argues that the reasoning we just rehearsed is valid only if Aristotle was 
attacking some form of Atomism, as most commentators assume.  But if the smallest parts 
are not assumed to be atoms, but infinitesimals, then further possibilities arise (pp. 146-147).  
Williams begins by challenging the logic of the following sentence: 
 
But if every body is divisible, given that a body mixed with another is homoeomerous, 
every part of one would have to come to be alongside some part of the other.  (328a3-5) 
 
Williams finds the sentence inconsistent on the Atomist reading of this argument.  If there is 
infinite divisibility, then there are no atoms, and hence uniformity qua adjacency of atoms 
would be impossible; yet exactly the opposite seems to be suggested in Aristotle’s sentence 
above, which turns it into nonsense.  In consequence, Williams suggests that possibly 
Aristotle is here entertaining an account of mixing based on a theory of infinitesimals (pp. 
147-148), not atoms.  According to it, ‘every (infinitesimal) part of B would have to get 
alongside some part of C and vice versa.  Homoeomerous mixture = alternation of 
infinitesimal parts’ (p. 147, where B and C are the ingredients of the mixture).  According to 
Williams, this is the only way to make sense of Aristotle’s quoted sentence above, and not 
through the traditional Atomist reading of it.  Furthermore, Williams wonders whether 
Aristotle’s ‘rough rejection of it [is] a sign that he has not fully grasped its significance, that 
he has perhaps confused it with an Atomist theory of indivisible minima’ (p. 148).  
Aristotle’s rejection of it is based on his claim that ‘there is no such thing as a thing’s being 
divided into parts which are the smallest possible’ (328a5-6).    
 
Has Aristotle missed out on a possible explanation of mixing?  Williams does not explain 
how this reading might helps us make sense of Aristotle’s sentence above, other than to say 
that we should think of infinite division resulting, not in atoms, but in limits or infinitesimals.  
Let us pursue this interpretation.  Consider a mixture where the ingredients divide each other 
infinitely; there is total interpenetration.  We could think of two lines, a red and a green one, 
merging into one line.  Take the case of infinitesimals first, i.e. the points in the lines.  The 
lines would be thoroughly mixed after their merger, in the sense that given any two points of 
one of the lines there would always be a point of the other line in between them.  This would 
indeed satisfy the thorough divisibility and mixture requirements, as well as the conception 
of uniformity given in the sentence above as systematic juxtaposition (328a3-5).  The case of 
limits may be of even greater interest.  Let us suppose the merger results in a line, every point 
of which is a limit for each of the two lines.  I mean the following: every point in the merger 
is a point where each of the two lines meet – it is an end point, as it were, of each of the two 
lines, at which the two lines touch.  Then we can think of each point as being the limit at 
which each of the two lines converges.  In that sense, each of the two lines is present at each 
point!  Could it be that such an account of mixing would satisfy, not the systematic 
juxtaposition requirement any more, but indeed the Aristotelian conception of uniformity, 
where every part of the mixture is of the same kind as the mixture (as in water)?   
 
There are several reasons why Aristotle would not be satisfied either with the infinitesimals 
or with the limits conception of mixing.  First, for Aristotle there is no thorough 
interpenetration, because no infinite process, such as the infinite division of bodies, can be 
actualised (328a5-6).  Further, the solution in terms of the infinitesimals or the limits requires 
that the lines be composed of them, which introduces the problem of the dimensionless 
making up an entity with dimensions points or limits cannot be parts of a line, whereas the 
division of a body for Aristotle is division into parts;  when does this division cease to 
separate parts and isolates entities without dimension?  Furthermore, at least on the account 
with infinitesimals, we still have mere composition, whereas Aristotle distinguishes mixing 
from composition (328a6-7); the components of such composition are either of the one or the 
other kind of stuff, hence it is not a proper Aristotelian homoeomer (like water).  Finally, on 
either the infinitesimals or the limits account, we cannot explain how mixtures can have 
different proportions of ingredients (e.g. 2:3 parts respectively).   
 
So Aristotle is neither confused, nor does he fail to fully grasp the significance of the 
suggestion made at 328a3-5.   Even more importantly, this sentence is not inconsistent.  
Williams is wrong to accuse Aristotle of all these failings, because as we saw, infinitesimals 
do not provide an answer towards an account of mixing.  How then are we to understand 
328a3-5?  It introduces mixing by division into parts.  Even with every body being divisible, 
for Aristotle the end points of such division processes are not infinitesimals, since infinite 
processes are not actual.  The end points of divisions would not even be atoms, since ‘there is 
no such thing as a thing’s being divided into parts which are the smallest possible’ (328a5-6).  
So division produces only small particles.  Furthermore, it is clear that for the purposes of the 
mixing by division hypothesis, Aristotle is introducing the term ‘homoeomer’ in an everyday 
way of understanding it, namely as uniform juxtaposition, e.g. as it would apply to the sand 
on the beach which is homoeomerous: grains of different types of stone are intermingled with 
one another uniformly.  This is clear from the stringent requirement of thorough juxtaposition 
in 328a3-5: given (eiper) that mixed bodies are uniform, every part of one would have (deoi 
an) to come to be alongside some part of the other.  This explanation of a homoeomer is of 
course incompatible with Aristotle’s understanding of it (as it applies to water), but he is 
countenancing it here to present his reasons against mixture by division, which he does in the 
lines that follow.  Such an intermingling of parts would be a composition, not a mixture; it 
would not be a proper homoeomer (like water), since it would have parts whose kind would 
be different from that of the whole (e.g. being just salt, or just pepper); and finally, it would 
not be uniform even in the juxtaposition sense, because due to divisibility, some parts of each 
of the intermingled ingredients would always be adjacent to, or contained in, parts of the 
same ingredient (328a5-16).  This completes Aristotle’s criticism of mixing by division.   
 
 
The Account of Mixing and Potential Persistence 
 
Aristotle seeks the solution to the puzzle of mixing in the distinction between the ingredients 
surviving in potentiality, and their surviving in actuality.  He is concerned to distinguish 
mixing of substances from the generation and destruction of substances on the one hand, and 
from the growth of substances on the other.  In so doing, he generates a new metaphysical 
theory which accounts for the uniformity of the kind of the stuff that substances are made of, 
e.g. of blood or of bark.  I will first present in outline Aristotle’s theory of mixing, and then 
examine how successfully his theory addresses the challenges it faces. 
 
To be and not to be; that is the challenge.  Aristotle says it is possible for the ingredients of 
the mixture to be and not to be in the mixture: 
 
Since some things that are, are potential, and some actual, it is possible for things 
after they have been mixed in some way to be and not to be.  Some other thing which 
comes to be [gegonos] from them is actually [i.e. the mixture], while each of the 
things which were, before they were mixed, still is, but potentially, and has not been 
destroyed [ouk apollota].  This is the solution to the problem raised by the previous 
argument.  (327b23-26, my emphasis.)   
 
In this initial statement of the solution, we find the first of the two principles of the 
Aristotelian account of mixing regarding the fate of the ingredients in the process of mixing – 
they are not destroyed, but survive in potentiality.  This is qualified by a further claim, which 
is related to the first but regards the fate of the ingredients post-mixture:  
 
Things that are mixed manifestly come together from having formerly been separate, 
and are capable of being separated again [chrizesthai palin].  (327b27-29, my 
emphasis)   
 
The second principle is the requirement we encountered in the discussion of mixtures modulo 
perception about the nature of the new thing which comes to be, namely the mixture itself: 
 
a body mixed with another is homoeomerous …  
… we say that if things have in fact been mixed the mixture has to be homoeomerous, 
and that just as a part of water is water so it is with what has been mingled.  (328a4-
12) 
 
We can thus summarise the Principles of Mixing on which Aristotle’s solution is based as 
follows: 
 
PM1 Survival: The ingredients that are mixed survive in the mixture in 
potentiality, not in actuality, and can be separated again.   
 
PM2 Uniformity: The parts of a mixture are of the same kind as the whole 
mixture.   
 
There are issues to examine, question, and explain in relation to the two principles.  We shall 
be aided by Aristotle’s discussion of the ways in which mixing differs from other 
phenomena, and his examination of borderline cases of mixing.     
 
Survival in the mixture is explained in terms of potentiality, but the latter notion is broad 
enough to allow for a variety of types of survival.  To understand the type of potentiality at 
work in PM1, we need to determine the sense in which Aristotle claims the ingredients to 
still be in the mixture.  We saw in 327b23-26 above that the ingredients that go into a 
mixture in some way are even after they have been mixed; they are potentially the things they 
were before the mixture; and they have not been destroyed.  But they also are not, because 
some other thing has come to be from them as ingredients.  The sense in which they are not is 
given by an example Aristotle offers to contrast the survival of the ingredients with survival 
in accidental unities such as of the body and its whiteness.  The first difference is that the 
ingredients that go into a mixture are not ontologically dependent entities in the way that an 
affection is, e.g. the whiteness of a body: ‘When two things are mixed each must exist as a 
separable thing, and no affection is separable’ (327b22-23).  The second difference is that 
‘neither do they both remain in actuality like the body and its whiteness, nor do they perish – 
either of them or both – because their potentiality is preserved’ (327b29-31).  A body 
remains that very same body in actuality when it becomes white, and whiteness is in actuality 
when it qualifies the body.   
 
The ontological dependence of whiteness on the body does not threaten its actuality, which 
consists in being the specific type of pale that white is.  But if the ingredients of a mixture 
remained in actuality, their actuality would involve actuality of form, and of                                                
ontological separateness, not only separability.  But we already know that Aristotle said in 
327b22-23 that the things that are mixed remain only separable.  Therefore, they are neither 
separate, ontologically independent, nor therefore could they retain their form in actuality, as 
whiteness does, since they are essentially the type of entity that is separate.  Another thing 
comes to be from them, and they become ontologically dependent on it while mixed, as its 
components.  But they do not get composed into this new thing in the way that the parts of a 
substance are composed into the substance as a whole.  They do not become reidentified by 
being enformed by the substantial form of the new entity.  The impact on their nature of their 
demotion to ingredients in the mixture is of a different type than the assimilation of 
components into a new substance.  We shall turn to the type of change suffered by their 
nature in what follows.   
 
Separability, which Aristotle insists on for the ingredients in a mixture, is a fundamental 
requirement which characterises mixing as a distinct type of process.  It distinguishes mixing 
from the generation of a substance by specifying how the ingredients survive in the mixture; 
they are recoverable, while what is transformed in a generation is not recoverable.  But more 
importantly, it gives us a criterion for the potentiality of the ingredients in a mixture, which 
distinguishes this potentiality from other types of it.  The criterion is that the ingredients in a 
mixture retain whatever their numerical recovery requires.  They do not survive in the 
mixture, for then the mixture would be their mere alteration, which we found dismissed in 
the initial puzzle.  But the recovery will be a recovery of things numerically identical to the 
initial ingredients, not of things like these ingredients.
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What is required to retain the potentiality for the recovery of the numerically identical 
entities?  Aristotle does not offer the answer to this question, but a solution can be found to 
fit the framework of his account of mixing.  In order to address this question we need to 
examine the second Principle of Mixing, Uniformity.   
 
Uniformity, or homoeomerity, has figured in the preliminary discussion of mixing we 
examined in the above, in different senses, but finally as the requirement that a part of a 
mixture be the same type of stuff as the whole, as it is with water.  What we have not 
encountered so far is the mechanism through which different ingredients together manage 
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  Despite Aristotle’s explicit assertion of the recoverability of the ingredients that go 
into a mixture, there are cases where the ingredients are recoverable in principle only.  
For example, consider mixing some hot and cold water.  It will appear in what follows 
why I believe that even in such a case they are recoverable in principle.   
this feat, namely to produce a thing that is a single type of stuff, uniformly throughout.  
Aristotle describes this mechanism as follows: 
 
when the two are more or less equal in strength, then each changes from its own 
nature in the direction of the dominant one, though it does not become the other but 
something in  between and common to both.  (328a28-31) 
 
Consider mixing two ingredients that can affect one another, e.g. honey and wine.  The 
honey becomes less viscous and more watery or wet, due to the effect of the wine on it, and 
more sour, while the wine becomes thicker, less watery, and sweeter due to the effect of the 
honey on it.  The causal interaction reaches equilibrium at some point, when neither the wine 
nor the honey, in their new tempered state, overtop the other in being watery, or acidic, or 
viscous or sweet.  Both are equally viscous or acidic, etc.  Thus the effect of each on the 
other stabilises.  But it does not stop, because then each of the two would revert to its own 
nature of being more liquidy and sour, or more viscous and sweet.   
 
It is fundamental to understanding Aristotle’s explanation of mixing that we recognise that 
the essential nature of each of the ingredients of the mixture is changed, compromised.  
Their natures are not destroyed, because that would result in their corruption and the 
generation of new substances.  Although their natures are not destroyed, they are altered, 
though not irrecoverably, since that would be destruction and the generation of a new type of 
substance.  Their natures are altered under the causal influence of each on the other 
ingredient, while that influence lasts.  We should think of the natures of each of the 
ingredients in a mixture as a compressed spring, which remains so while the force is exerted 
upon it, but is ready to recover its full length when released from the force exerted upon it.  If 
we think of two springs pressing against each other until their powers equalise, we begin to 
see how the nature of each ingredient in a mixture imposes itself on the other, bringing about 
changes until their respective natures are compromised to the point of not being able to affect 
the other more in any way.  They keep each other at this compromised state of tension and 
strength equilibrium by continuously affecting each other and checking each other’s nature 
for any kind of superiority in causal efficacy.  The result is a type of mutual normalising of 
natures.   
 
We are now in the position to address the question of the First Principle of how the 
ingredients retain the potentiality for numerical identity.  The one factor is the inevitable fate 
of each ingredient in the mixture: it is altered by the other ingredient until the causal powers 
of their contrarieties are equalised; the other factor is that each ingredient must retain the 
potentiality to recover, or revert to, the object it was before entering the mixture.  If these two 
factors cooperate when we mix, the result is a mixture; if not, the result is either compresence 
of different (unmixed) materials, or destruction of one or both of them.  Therefore, however 
the potentiality of an ingredient to be the object it was is retained, this must not impede the 
causal equalising of contrarieties in the ingredients.  Aristotle requires that ‘each changes 
from its own nature [phusis] in the direction of the dominant one, though it does not become 
the other but something in between and common to both [koinon]’ (328a30-31).  By 
‘dominant’ Aristotle means any type of causal strength that each of the ingredients has on the 
nature of the other.  What is common to both is the compromised state of each ingredient’s 
nature which equalises them in causal efficacy.  This means that neither is superior to the 
other in respect of any contrariety, such as hot or cold or wet or dry, or their derivatives, 
which are the characteristics that determine the nature of each ingredient.  So the 
compromised natures are equal in wetness and heat, dryness and cold, etc.   
 
That the ingredients should be ‘more or less equal in strength’ (328a29) is also a tacit 
reference to the relative quantity of each ingredient.  Aristotle has said in just the previous 
sentence that when there is gross inequality of quantity between the two ingredients, then it is 
not possible for their opposite characteristics to keep each other balanced, but the one is 
overpowered by the other.  Going back to our springs example, a small spring would be 
crushed by a very powerful one, not just compressed.  Aristotle’s example is the following: 
 
when many of them are juxtaposed to few or large ones to small, then indeed they do 
not give rise to mixing, but to growth
4
 on the part of that which is dominant; for the 
other changes into the dominant one: thus a drop of wine is not mixed with ten 
thousand pitchersful of water, for its form dissolves and it changes into the totality of 
the water.  (328a24-28)   
 
The nature of the drop of wine is destroyed by the causal effect of the large quantity of water 
around it.  It is as if there were an inexhaustible source of opposite characteristics to those of 
the small quantity of wine, overwhelming the wine’s characteristics until even their source is 
obliterated, leaving no trace of the wine’s nature behind.  Quantity plays a role in the 
outcome, as causal strength is measured in quantity as well as intensity of opposites.  Thus 
extremely hot lava mixing with lukewarm mercury could result in equalising of temperatures, 
if there was plenty of lukewarm mercury around it.  But high intensity and large quantity are 
devastating; a drop of mercury in an erupting volcano would be destroyed.   
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  See note 2 above. 
So here is the metaphysical picture of mixtures so far: each ingredient in a mixture is 
changed in its essential nature, by having its characteristics compromised due to the causal 
interaction with the other ingredient.  The nature of each ingredient is not obliterated by the 
causal interaction, but altered, so that it is not any more the type of material that it was before 
entering the mixture; what it is missing are the characteristics which are necessary for this 
type of thing, but which are now compromised.  Although the ingredient does not possess 
these characteristics while in the mixture, it has not lost the power to restore them, if released 
from the causal interaction with the other ingredient.   
 
But what does the restoration of the nature of each ingredient involve?  On what is the 
potentiality for this restoration grounded?  It is grounded on the only factor in which the 
nature of an ingredient could be anchored, namely, the enformed matter of that ingredient.  
The enformed matter is what constitutes the ingredient before entering the mixture.  In the 
mixture, the matter of each ingredient is still enformed, but the form is altered, compromised 
by the causal effect of the other ingredient.  The matter of each ingredient is divided up into 
small parcels in the mixture, as we shall see in what follows.  But each part, say of honey, 
retains the potentiality to regain its original form when the causal influence is withdrawn. 
 
To see how it is possible to retain the potentiality even for a complex form, we can consider 
an example, which is not a case of mixing.  If we have a vase which we break up into small 
pieces, the form of the vase is retained in potentiality in the pieces, and can be restored if the 
pieces are glued together again.  There is no vase once it is broken up into pieces, but it has 
not been destroyed in the sense that it can be restored.  When restored, it is numerically the 
same vase as it was before it was broken up.  Now consider two vases which crush onto each 
other.  The tiny pieces from each vase become mixed up in the resulting rubble.  But both, 
the forms of the vases and the vases themselves can be restored.  But achieving the latter 
requires more than restoration of shape; to restore numerically identical vases we need to 
select out the pieces of each vase.  To see why, consider two identical vases which we cut up 
into tiny square pieces each, and then mix up the pieces.  It is possible to restore two vases by 
putting the appropriately shaped pieces together, paying no attention to the origin of the 
pieces but only to their shape.  Then we would have two new vases which would be identical 
in form to the original ones, but not numerically identical to either of the original ones.  The 
numerical identity of the original and the restored vases requires restoring the same form and 
matter of each vase.  The sameness of matter secures physical continuity and brings with it 
the historical features of the form of each vase.
5
   
 
The same analysis applies to mixtures, too.  The matter of each ingredient in a mixture is 
divided up into small pieces which interact with the pieces of the other ingredient, 
compromising the form of each other.  But when each piece of each ingredient is not being 
affected by the other ingredient, then its form is restored; and when the pieces of the each 
ingredient are put together again, then each ingredient is restored.  Each ingredient is restored 
because the original quantity of matter regains the same form, e.g. of honey or wine, as it had 
before entering the mixture.  The same type of complexity that we encountered in the case of 
the vases can be encountered here too, e.g. by mixing two similar wines together.  But their 
similarity does  not change the metaphysics of the mixture.  The same analysis of potentiality 
of forms and of ingredients remains, even if restoration is possible only in principle.   
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  Finally, if the two vases are pulverised and then mixed up, it may be only in 
principle possible to restore them again, but not in practice.  The potentiality for the 
form and each vase to be restored would remain, but we may not be able to bring it 
about. 
Aristotle’s account of mixing applies to mixtures where the ingredients affect each other’s 
nature.  If the ingredients affect each other’s accidental properties, then restoration of 
accidental features cannot be secured, although separation of ingredients is possible at least 
in principle.  For example consider mixing hot and cold water.  The quantities mixed will 
give rise to lukewarm water; they can even, in principle, be separated out again.  But their 
original temperatures will not be restored to each of the ingredients by the separtion.  The 
reason is that the potentiality of form is not preserved, because there is no anchoring of the 
accidental features onto any particular matter; the original heat of each quantity of water is 
not tied to that quantity of water but to its previous environment.  This contrasts with the case 
of the compromise of the nature of each ingredient; here the form of each ingredient is 
anchored onto the enformed matter of the ingredient; honey is sweet unless, and while, under 
the influence of e.g. wine.   
 
The formal and the historical continuity between the ingredient before entering, and after it 
enters the mixture is what distinguishes mixing from generation.  In generation, although the 
same quantity of matter remains, it loses the form of the original object, and with it the 
historical continuity with that object, which is why that object cannot be restored.  Even if the 
same form is repeated, as it could in a metal statue, the causal history of that form anchors it 
in the new, post destruction, environment, not in the matter/nature of the original statue.  By 
contrast, the parcels of the enformed (but compromised) matter of an ingredient in a mixture 
are the seat of the physical, formal, and historical continuity with the original ingredient.  
They possess the potentialities for the restoration of the form and also the ingredient.  In 
some cases, restoration may be physically possible, as in the case of salt and water.  But in 
other cases it will be only in principle possible, as in the case of water and wine.  Even in this 
case, the parcels of matter of the ingredients carry the potentialities for restoration, but 
separating them out from the mingled state they are in the mixture would be a physical feat.   
 
This is what a mixture is for Aristotle.  The ingredients that enter the mixture causally affect 
each other until their powers of contrarieties are equalised.  This process deforms each of 
them, equalising their contrarieties, and keeps them in that common state while their causal 
effect on each other lasts.  In that state, the matter of each ingredient is still informed by the 
nature of each ingredient, but the nature is compromised due to the causal effect of the other 
ingredient (328a28-31).   
 
Uniformity is thereby achieved.  Every part of the mixture is equipotent with every other part 
of the mixture.  None is warmer or sweeter or drier than other parts of the mixture.  Some of 
these parts are parts of the first ingredient, some of the second, and some of both; but their 
form in the mixture is the same, being checked for excess or deficiency by the causal powers 
of each on the other.  At the same time, each part of the mixture caries potentialities and 
continuities which are not shared by every other part of the mixture or by the whole.  These 
are the ground for the possibility of the restoration of each ingredient after having been 
mixed.   
 
 
Further Considerations on the Mechanism of Mixing 
 
In the above I have assumed that each ingredient is cut up into small pieces while in the 
mixture.  This follows from Aristotle’s account of causal interaction between ingredients, to 
which I will now turn.  Causal interaction smoothes out differences in contrarieties: ‘what is 
active makes the patient like itself.  For agent and patient are contraries, and coming to be is 
to the contrary.  So it is necessary that the patient change into the agent …’ (324a10-13); ‘of 
agents, those are capable of being mixed which have a contrariety (for it is these which are 
capable of being acted upon by one another)’ (328a31-33).  Thus the ingredients of a mixture 
change each other into something that is common to both, since both act as agents and as 
patients until they equalise their contrarieties.   
 
The way that causation is engendered is by the contact between the agent and the patient: 
 
“for neither is acting and being affected possible in the strict sense for things which 
cannot be in contact with each other, nor can things be mixed unless they have first 
had some sort of contact.  …  It is necessary for those things which are involved in 
mixing to be capable of contact with one another, and the same holds for anything 
which properly speaking acts on, or is affected by, another.”  (322b22-29) 
 
Contact is a necessary condition for the agent to affect the patient.  Thus the ingredients of a 
mixture need to be in contact with one another in order to affect each other.  But contact by 
itself may not be sufficient for mixing to take place.  Further conditions need to obtain to 
expedite mixing. 
 
To understand the complexity of the mechanism of causation it would be helpful to consider 
how fire warms up the water in a pot.  Fire warms up the pot by coming in contact with it.  
But fire does not come in contact with the water in the pot, although it manages to warm it up 
as well.  This is achieved by fire warming up the pot, which is in contact with the water, and 
thereby warms up the water.  The end result is that the heating effect of the fire extends to 
some distance from the point of contact between it and the pot.  I will call this distance 
between the point of (agent-patient) contact and the furthest point in the patient which is 
affected by the agent the causal range of the agent on the patient.   
 
Aristotle does not talk of the causal range of an agent on a patient, but it follows from his 
description of what expedites mixing.  He says: 
 
amongst things which are divisible and capable of being affected those which are 
easily bounded are capable of being mixed, since they divide easily into small parts 
… For instance, liquids are the type of bodies most liable to mixing, for liquids are 
the most easily bounded of divisible things, unless they are viscous.  (328a35-b4)   
 
We can explain why those bodies which are divisible and easily bounded are most of all 
capable of being mixed.  Being most easily bounded maximises contact between agent and 
patient.  Secondly, being divisible into small parts makes possible the causal effect of the 
agent to reach all the parts of the patient.  Thus ‘small quantities put alongside small 
quantities mix better, because they change one another more easily and quickly’ (328a33-34).  
The contact area increases and the distance which the effect has to reach decreases.  Things 
which do not divide up easily resist mixing with whatever they are brought into contact: 
‘liquids are … most liable to mixing … unless they are viscous (these have the effect only of 
multiplying and increasing bulk)’ (328b3-5).   
 
It therefore follows that for Aristotle, each of the ingredients of a mixture is divided into 
small parts and is in contact with the parts of the other ingredient.  But the parts are not 
infinitesimal.  We already saw that Aristotle does not believe that a division could be carried 
to completion (328a5-6).  In fact, the division need be such as to allow each part of each 
ingredient, acting as agents, to causally affect through and through each part of the other 
ingredient acting as patient.  The causal range of the causal efficacy of each ingredient will 
place an upper limit on how large the pieces can be in the mixture before mixing stops being 
possible.  But if the parts into which each ingredient is divided are not too large for their 
causal range, the intermingling of parts of the ingredients will suffice to allow the causal 
equilibrium to be reached, reducing the ingredients to the common state that is the uniform 
nature of the mixture.   
 
Thus, the common form of the mixture is not a ratio between ingredients.  It is not that e.g. 
there are two parts of the one and three parts of the other ingredient in every part of the 
mixture we consider.  On Aristotle’s account, it may be that a part of the mixture derives 
fully from one only ingredient.  But what makes the mixture uniform is that the form of that 
part of the mixture is the same as the form of a part that derives from the other ingredient; 
namely, the common form that results from the causal equilibrium between the ingredients.
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So, there is in a sense mingling of parts of different origin, deriving from different 
ingredients, in a mixture, but unlike the composition of barley and wheat, there is no 
mingling of natures in a mixture, because of the uniformity of all parts irrespective of 
derivation.   
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 When discussing the barley-wheat type of composition, Aristotle says that they are 
not mixed because the composition is not a homoeomer: ‘nor will the part have the 
same proportion [logos] as the whole’ (328a9).  It should not be thought that Aristotle 
is here defining uniformity in terms of the proportion of the ingredients being the 
same in every part of it as it is in the whole.  This is clear from the fact that he 
immediately proceeds to give the example of water as a paradigmatic homoeomer.  
But it is also clear from the fact that he denies the possibility of division into 
infinitesimals (328a5-6) which would be a presupposition for such a definition of 
uniformity.  What Aristotle is saying here is that in the barley-wheat composition we 
do not have even the same proportion of different ingredients in the part as in the 
whole (let alone the same stuff, as we do in the case of water).   
 
The difference in origin of the parts in a mixture does not prevent the uniformity of the 
mixture.  But does it have consequences for what can be derived from each part of the 
mixture?  Aristotle in fact seems to make an even more stringent claim than that the initial 
ingredients of a mixture can be restored after they have been mixed.  He seems to claim that 
any of the initial ingredients can be derived, not just from the mixture, but from any part of 
the mixture:  
 
It follows [from Empedocles’s account] that fire and water cannot come to be from 
any particle of flesh whatsoever, in the way that with wax, whilst from this part a 
sphere might come to be and a pyramid from some other, it would always be possible 
for it to happen the other way round.  This does in fact occur in this way, i.e. from 
flesh both elements can come to be from any particle whatsoever.  According to the 
account we have been discussing, however, it would not be possible: it would have to 
be the way that stone and brick come from a wall, one from one place and part, one 
from another.  (334a31-b1)   
 
This is prima facie a difficulty for the interpretation I am offering of Aristotle on mixing.  On 
my explanation, the matter of the initial ingredients remains fragmented and deformed in the 
mixture.  Isolating any such part of the mixture from the causal influence of the other parts of 
the mixture that are in contact with it would allow the compromised nature of the initial 
ingredient to be restored in that part, e.g. into water or earth.  But Aristotle seems to claim 
here that from that part of the mixture either water, or earth could be derived.   
 
The claim is not that in every part of the mixture both ingredients are present.  This could be 
somehow explained by a presence of a compromised part of one ingredient at a place in a 
mixture, or by the presence of the causal influence of the other ingredient on it.  These are 
two senses in which both ingredients are present in every part of the mixture.  But the claim 
here seems to be more stringent.  Aristotle appears to want either of the initial ingredients to 
be derivable from any part of the mixture [ex hotououn amf ginesthai, 334b35], not just 
present in every part of the mixture.  Nor does he mean that any particle of the mixture can 
produce both ingredients at the same time.  His example of the pyramid and the sphere shows 
that when the mixture is dissolved, from any part either the one or the other ingredient will be 
restored.   
 
I believe that if Aristotle is claiming the omni-derivability of a mixture’s ingredients from the 
mixture, the claim is unsustainable.  The reason is the following: suppose that in one case of 
dissolution of a mixture, all the original matter of one ingredient comes to constitute the other 
ingredient, and vice versa; e.g. all the matter of the water that went into the mixture comes to 
have the properties of earth, and all the matter of the original earth comes to have the 
properties of water.  Then we do not have the recovery of the initial ingredients, but only of 
some earth and some water, generated from the mixture.  The resulting elements are not the 
original ingredients because their matter has totally changed.  If we took them to be the same, 
then any pool of water would also turn out to be identical to any other pool of water, and 
similarly for parcels of earth.  Hence, if Aristotle’s claim is that either ingredient can be 
derived from any part of the mixture, the claim is simply false.   
 
But maybe, on the other hand, Aristotle does not say that either of the original ingredients 
can be derived from any part of the mixture, but only that either of the elements that the 
mixture contains can be derived from any part of it: ‘from flesh both elements [i.e. fire and 
water] can come to be from any particle whatsoever’ (334b35).  If Aristotle is here 
indifferent as to whether we derive new parcels of earth from a part of the flesh, or the 
original ingredients, then my account has no difficulty accommodating this.  In the case of 
the generation of the new element from the mixture, external causal factors would need to 
explain its generation according to any account.   
 
Aristotle does not give us the mechanics of how the original ingredients can be restored from 
a mixture, let alone how either ingredient can be restored from any part of the mixture, if this 
is being claimed at all.  The account I offered above in terms of the original ingredients 
remaining fragmented and compromised in the mixture supplies the mechanism for the first, 
to complement what Aristotle explains about mixtures.  What his claim is about the second 
remains a speculation, which on either reading of it does not add content to his account, but if 
anything, misleads.   
 
  
